Arab Mediterranean Free Trade Agreement

4A followed by the Barcelona Declaration, the Euro-Mediterranean Association Agreements (EMAA) were signed and signed with Tunisia (1995; 1998), Israel (1995); Morocco (1996; 2000), the Palestinian Authority (1997; 1997), Jordan (1997; 2002), Egypt (2001; 2004), Lebanon (2002; 2003) and Algeria (2002; 2005). With Syria, the agreement was signed in 2004. However, at the time, the Council of the EU refused to sign the agreement because of the difficult political situation in the country. In 2009, relations between Syria, and in particular France, were restored after Syria`s diplomatic efforts to break out of its international isolation. Following the opening of relations, the Swedish Presidency asked Syria in October 2009 to sign the Association Agreement negotiated in 2004, an offer that the country refused because it wanted more time to consider the potential impact of the agreement on its economy. [13] There is also no contractual relationship with Libya at present, as a result of the sanctions imposed by the EU in 1999. In 2004, sanctions were lifted and the EU opened discussions with the country to improve relations. Negotiations for a framework agreement began in November 2008 and are still ongoing. [14] 14 Another important condition for the establishment of a comprehensive EMFTA is the conclusion of free trade agreements between the MDCs. However, so far, the EMI and trade negotiations, in particular, have had a relationship between the eu`s pivot and the pivot (see above). The MNCs have not been able to integrate their economies.

Their intra-regional trade remains at a very low and prohibitive level. This discourages international investors. As a result, MDCs continue to hold a very small share of the global CDF, although CDF is seen as necessary to stimulate economic development. In November 2008, the members of the Agadir Agreement signed a protocol on textile trade. Overall, however, the impact of the agreement on the economy and policymakers remained “below expectations.” 18 Another important player is the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC-Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates). [46] These countries have large financial surpluses as a result of their oil exports. Traditionally, they invest these surpluses in industrialized countries (mainly the United States and Europe), but their FDI flows increasingly flow to the neighbouring Mediterranean, with concentration in the Mashreq. With the GAFTA, GCC countries are creating a common market with the MDCs and are likely to disrupt the EMFTA again. While it is difficult to assess the impact of this U.S. and GCC trade policy on CEMTA, such competitive liberalization increases the creation of a regional free trade area, in part because of competing rules of origin, technical standards, safety and health. This has already been felt in the problems that the free trade agreement between the United States and Morocco has caused in the implementation of the Agadir agreement.

The “preferential clause” for agricultural products in this free trade agreement, which allows US exporters of such products to access the market that Morocco grants to other trading partners, could also complicate EU-Morocco integration and regional trade in the future. Although Russia and China are not yet active in trade policy, their trade and political presence is also important for Euro-Mediterranean policy. Russia is interested in the Mediterranean because of clearly defined economic interests and broader strategic objectives. [47] Finally, China is increasingly present in the MNCs. North African countries have become important suppliers of raw materials and energy to starving Chinese industries. [48] At the same time, China has become a major supplier and investor for MNCs.